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The confl ict widens
This challenge came from the Swiss cantons, where there was much illfeeling against him. He had promised them Bellinzona, but gone back on his word. Thousands who had served him and Charles VIII in Italy claimed they were still owed money. In August 1501 around 4,000 Swiss, together with 300 exiles from Lombardy, seized Lugano south of Bellinzona. The French took this incursion very seriously, deploying about 10,000 troops against them. After seventeen days, the Swiss withdrew, and in mid-September the French recognized the possession of Bellinzona by the forest cantons for two years, and arrangements were made for settlement of the arrears of pay. 1 This was only a provisional settlement, and after further negotiations failed, in mid-March 1503 15,000 Swiss descended on Locarno on the Lago Maggiore. Raids further into the Milanese provoked alarm and unrest. Wanting to concentrate on the war in Naples, Louis was ready to make concessions and cede Bellinzona. Although this was not enough to satisfy the forest cantons, the others were not prepared to continue the war for their benefi t, and agreed the Peace of Arona with the French on 11 April. An attempt by the Grisons, immediately after this peace, to sieze Chiavenna was quickly thwarted. But the French remained nervous about the northern frontier, and kept their most numerous garrisons in the duchy to guard it.
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The beginning of the War of the League of Cambrai
Agents were also sent to raise some Swiss infantry, but there was a problem. The agreement Louis and the Swiss had made in 1499, allowing him to recruit whenever he needed their men, was due to expire, and the cantons would not renew it. Not really understanding the complex political processes of consultation among the cantons, the French trusted to bribes, gifts and pensions, freely distributed to infl uential individuals, to get them whatever they wanted. They were inclined to regard the Swiss as subordinates, who should accede to the wishes of the king, not as allies. Resentment at this reinforced anti-French sentiments which had always been present. French proposals to renew the agreement with Louis were received coldly. Yet many poor Swiss still needed the money to be earned from service as mercenaries, and French agents were able to recruit several thousand volunteers, although these were considered inferior – less cohesive, less disciplined – to the bands provided by the cantons. In any case, Louis was ready to turn to the Grisons, and to landsknechts, to provide expert pike infantry while (it was hoped) French infantry could be drilled into effective substitutes.
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The campaign in the Veneto in 1511
Receiving no help from the Empire this time, Maximilian could not get together a stable, substantial fi eld army to match the forces provided by Louis. If he managed to double the number of soldiers at Verona, the base of his Italian operations, there were still chronic shortages of money and supplies, and the hungry men were alienating the people by their thieving and brutality. Finding a commander was a problem too. He appointed Francesco Gonzaga his captain-general, but Gonzaga again avoided taking up a command that would have compromised his stance of refusal to commit fully to any side. La Palisse was in command of the French contingent of 700–800 lances and the best part of 6,000 infantry, of whom 1,800 were Grisons. 88 French troops formed the bulk of the 10,000 foot and 3,000 horse that left Verona in early August.
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The settlement in Milan
Finding a settlement for the duchy of Milan was a complex problem – one impossible to resolve satisfactorily for all the interested parties. TheVenetians were set on recovering all the territories they had held before 1509, but their claims confl icted with those of Maximilian, who wanted Bergamo. The Swiss were establishing themselves in the lands at the mouths of the Alpine valleys; the Grisons had opportunistically seized Chiavenna and the Valtellina in June, and did not intend to give them up. None of the other powers approved of the pope’s annexation of Parma and Piacenza. Nor did the Milanese, who thought the duchy should have the same borders as under Ludovico Sforza, with an independent duke.
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The French return to Milan, 1523–4
In accordance with the advice of the Venetian commissioner, Leonardo Emo, when the Venetians came to join up with the imperial army in early February, the joint forces pushed the French back across the Ticino. Bonnivet’s army was wasting away from disease and shortages. A diversion by Renzo da Ceri, who brought 5,000 Grisons into the territory of Bergamo, was repelled by a detachment of Venetian troops and Giovanni de’ Medici, who had been sent with his infantry to guard Milan.
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The Battle of Pavia
Estimates of the size of the armies vary considerably. Both had lost men in the skirmishes since the imperial camp arrived, and through disease and desertion. Thousands of Grisons had just been recalled from the French camp. Florange, who fought in the battle and was captured, put the numbers in the French army on the day as 600 men-at-arms and 17,500 infantry. He claimed to have heard in a debate over dinner at Pescara’s table afterwards that there were 24,000 infantry, 1,200 men-at-arms and 1,200 light horse in the imperial fi eld army, and 8,000 infantry and 220 men-at-arms in the Pavia garrison. 35 This probably underestimated the strength of the French and overestimated that of the imperial army. Francis himself spoke after the battle of having had 26,000 infantry.
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The war in Lombardy, 1527–8
De Leyva calculated he was confronted by 13,000–14,000 infantry, 500 men-at-arms and 700 light horse of the Venetians and Francesco Sforza. 67 He believed his men were outnumbered four to one, but decided to go to challenge the Venetians and Sforza when they came to Marignano. On reaching Marignano, he attacked with only his Spanish and Italian troops – the Germans, not keen on night marches, had lagged behind – and succeeded in expelling them. They withdrew to a nearby encampment surrounded by ditches, where he penned then up. In late July, hearing that Giangiacomo de’ Medici had arrived near Monza with several thousand Swiss in French pay, he went to attack them there. The Swiss and Grisons ‘fought like devils’, and he had never been in such a fi erce fi ght in his life, the veteran commander reported to the emperor, but at the third assault his men had prevailed.
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The renewal of the war in Piedmont, 1542–4
On the left wing of the French the mounted archers from the units of men-at-arms, charged the light horse on the imperial right wing, most of whom turned tail without making any fi ght. The archers had been positioned by a unit of Grisons and Italian infantry, on the other side ofwhich was d’Enghien with his men-at-arms, including the volunteers who had come from the court. These infantry wavered as the Grisons panicked when charged by the battalion of imperial infantry on that wing, who were Spanish veterans and Germans who had been long in Spanish service. As the Grisons and Italians fl ed, d’Enghien led his company in two costly charges through the ranks of the Spanish and German veterans, who killed many of their horses. Separated by rising ground from the battle in the centre, d’Enghien could not see the defeat of the landsknechts, and thought the battle lost. But the news had reached the veterans, who had been grouping to attack what remained of d’Enghien’s company, and they began to retreat. The victorious Swiss and French infantry from the centre joined d’Enghien’s men in pursuit.
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The War of Siena, 1552–5
The battle began when the imperial light horse, mostly mounted arquebusiers, on the left wing began to advance on the French light horse opposite them. At the sight of the imperial men-at-arms preparing to join in the charge, the French light horse, who had no men-at-arms with them, turned and fl ed. The imperial cavalry disappeared after the French horse. Marignano positioned his artillery on a height, and the guns were fi ring into the French infantry. Strozzi, having no artillery with which he could return fire, decided the best hope lay in trying to overcome the enemy infantry before the imperial cavalry returned, and sent his men across the valley. They fought hard, but took heavy losses as they pushed across the obstacle of the stream bed. Once again justifying their reputation for being inferior troops to their Swiss neighbours, the corps of Grisons in the French army broke. The return of the imperial cavalry completed the rout. Wounded, Strozzi had already had to leave the fi eld. French losses overall were estimated at 4,000 dead, and as many wounded or taken prisoner, including many captains. Most of the prisoners were soon released and sent home, except for 400 German troops who were taken into the imperial army. Imperial and Florentine losses were reckoned to be less than 200.